very widespread. It was awfully dangerous for a person who looked good to go there. I don't know why people change so much. Ukrainians are very generous and very kind people, but during that hunger they looked like wolves. 2 Today such graphic accounts provoke a variety of responses: disbelief, revulsion, and pity. Famine's symptoms vary-for example, convincing evidence for cannibalism in the Scottish and Ethiopian cases cited above is lacking-but they are always horrific. Are they likely to recur soon? Can the history of past famines help answer this question?
In what follows, I first outline some key findings of recent research into the symptoms and causes of famine. I then discuss two long-term consequences of famine. Finally I turn to the recent history of famine and what it might bode for the next decade or two.
1a. 'Natural Causes' and Human Agency
Parodoxically, the century that witnessed the greatest famine on record also witnessed the virtual elimination (for now at least) of major famines. The Great Leap Forward famine of 1959-61 was China's last. The era of famines in the former Soviet Union came to an end in 1946-47, while India's last famine was in the state of Maharashtra in 1972-3, and the world's most recent 'biblical' famine was arguably that described by Michael Buerk.
Most historical famines, including that in Maharashtra, would not have occurred but for significant and, more than likely, repeated harvest shortfalls in a context of economic backwardness. But the totalitarianism of Stalin, Mao, and their imitators is blamed for the Chinese and Soviet famines, and many other twentieth century famines. 3 The distinction between famines from 'natural causes' and other famines is useful: and it seems clear that human agency played a greater role in the major famines of the twentieth century than in earlier famines.
But the distinction can be pressed too far. In this respect Ralph Thaxton's recent compelling and moving account of Do Fo, a village in Henan province, during the the Great Leap Forward famine of 1959-61 has a particular resonance.
By way of context, Thaxton notes that living standards in Da Fo today are 'on par with those in rural Albania and the Philippines' 4 . A more appropriate comparison is that between living standards in those countries on the eve of the famine. In terms of GDP per head in the mid-1950s, estimates of the Philippines' advantage over China range from over two to one to about five to one (Table 1) .
Moreover, Da Fo is located in what was and remains one of China's poorest regions. Nor, of course, is it correct either to blame all earlier famines on overpopulation. Many were caused or exacerbated by wars, and much-or at least some-of the excess mortality associated with others might have been avoided by more effective human action-as in, say, Ireland in the 1840s or India in the 1870s.
The belief that elites might have done more to avert or mitigate disaster goes back much further than the nineteenth century; and so also does the sense that their legitimacy hinged on the insurance they offered against disaster. 9
1b. Causes of Death
During the twentieth century famine also changed how it kills. Sen's focus on the distributional aspects of famine suffering was extremely valuable. He drove the point home by describing several instances where-so he claimed-famine occurred despite no 'abnormal' reduction in food output. By implication those famines were zero-sum outcomes, with winners and losers, the winners being mainly those with access to land and credit. This perspective highlighted the scope for redistribution but also intellectualized the populist conviction throughout history that speculators, hoarders, and profiteers were responsible for turning food shortages into famine.
However, a competing intellectual tradition, dating back to Adam Smith and the French economists, rejects such a possibility. This is from the locus classicus:
Without intending the interest of the people, the inland corn dealer is necessarily led, by a regard to his own interest, to treat them, even in years of scarcity, pretty much in the same manner as the prudent master of a vessel is sometimes obliged to treat his crew. When he foresees that provisions are likely to run short, he puts them upon short allowance… The unlimited, unrestrained freedom of the corn trade, as it is the only effectual preventative of the miseries of a famine, so it is the best palliative of the inconveniencies of a dearth; for the inconveniencies of a real scarcity cannot be remedied; they can only be palliated. No trade deserves more the full protection of the law, and no trade requires it so much; because no trade is so much exposed to popular odium. 13 Now, if markets move food from where it is relatively cheap to where it is relatively expensive, they are probably saving lives. But are markets the 'effectual preventative' that Smith claimed? My own research points to instances where markets in the past did not exacerbate famine. 14 In nineteenth century Ireland and India, where Smith's views held sway and governments did not interfere with trade, the trouble usually was not that markets functioned perversely, but that they worked too slowly. In both cases, the lack of food encouraged some canny merchants to import more and export less food. But existing transport technologies meant that it took months for them to respond, and the uncertainties accompanying that very delay deterred many other merchants from trying their luck. 15 So markets were no panacea either because, to quote economist John Maynard Keynes out of context, 'in the long run we are all dead'.
NGOs and the international media are still prone to blame famine on market malfunction, but evidence that reduced market integration or excessive storage made famines worse in the recent past is weak. Corni and Deotti's study of Niger in 2005 rejects the claim that the rise in consumer prices stemmed from market balkanization during the crisis, while Jenny Aker reckons that grain markets in Niger were more integrated than normal during drought years such as 2005. Thus contrary to media claims, markets did not 'fail' in Niger during the 2005 crisis. 16 Today, thanks to huge reductions in the cost of transport and information, markets have the power to work much more effectively than in the past.
Long-run Consequences
A Kashmiri proverb states that 'famine goes, but the stains remain'. Even where famines are a thing of the past, they often have an after-life. This section focuses briefly on two aspects of the long-run impact of famine.
The first concerns collective memory of famine. A key theme of the sesquicentennial commemorations of the Great Irish Famine in the mid-1990s was that the Irish everywhere shared a collective or common memory of that catastrophe. The inclusive, first person plural language of so much of the commemorative rhetoric-'we are a first world country with a third world memory of famine, dislocation, and exile... Our own famine echoes are constantly with us', 'an event which traumatised this country', 'this country', 'a country with a memory', 'our own', 'our memory'-suggested collective memory in spades. An event which pitted 'me' against 'you' was remembered as 'us' and 'we'. But a divisive disaster that pitted not only the poor against the rich, but neighbour against neighbour and young against old, was hardly promising material for a communal, collective memory. It was almost as if the famine caused virtually all those living in Ireland during the famine to die or emigrate, with identical knockon effects on their traumatised descendants. But how could the memory of such a divisive disaster be truly collective? Surely, only by glossing over and filtering out much of the history of the famine? Collective memory, of course, always tells us more about the present than the past. By contrast, history-and this includes folklore and oral history-is complex and multifaceted, though hardly value-free either. 17 Nowhere today is famine memory more contested than in Ukraine. Former president Viktor Yushchenko championed a collective memory of the famine of 1932-33-what came to be called the Holomodor in the 1980s as genocide-but which his successor Viktor Yanukovich prefers to describe as a 'tragedy'. Some bloggers were quick to note that Yanukovych's 'first act' was to remove the Holodomor dedication on the presidential website. 18 In Ukraine memory competes with history, and breeds an embittered victimhood stakes that sometimes places the famine on a par with the Jewish Holocaust.
In neighbouring Moldova too, famine memory is fiercely contested. In late 2006, the Moldovan legislature rejected an attempt to provide 'a political and legal appreciation' of the 1946-1947 Moldovan famine. One opposition deputy claimed that the famine was the 'result of the premeditated policy promoted by the Stalinist regime' while another argued that the refusal of the majority to engage on the issue was 'a blasphemy towards the victims of those years'. A government supporter retorted that while there was no denying that there had been a famine, it had 'a pragmatic explanation historically demonstrated: the difficult post-war period, the poor crops, and the drought'. Stalin shared the blame, but only insofar as he did not react in time. 19 There are times when, as the American writer and activist David Rieff has recently argued, it is better to forget: to be married, and 5 per cent more likely to have never married. 22 And there is evidence that the damage extends to the third generation: yet another study of the Chinese famine finds that children of a parent born during the famine were smaller and lighter, and that the effect was greater for boys than for girls. 23 Such findings imply that the human cost of famines is greater than previously thought.
Never Say Never!
A study published a decade ago 24 claimed that famine was responsible for 70 million deaths during the twentieth century, or more than either world war. But Less than a decade later, Maharashtra was struck by India's last famine (so far), in which 'at very least' seventy thousand people perished. 29 With such caveats in mind, is there any point in peering ahead? Yes, insofar as studying the past helps identify what makes famine more likely. What follows, accordingly, is less a forecast than a review of those factors that would affect the likelihood of famine over the next decade or two.
First Some Bad News
It is not easy to conjure exceptions to Amartya Sen's 'law' that democracy and famine don't mix. 30 Malawi in 2002 might seem to be one-a Malawian member of parliament declared at the height of the crisis that 'if we don't handle the food crisis well, it will be difficult to convince people to vote for us'-although that would be stretching the definitions of both democracy and famine. 31 Maharashtra in 1972-73 offers another partial exception, although accounts of that famine stress how much worse it might have been but for the relief efforts of the authorities. 32 Recent evidence from famine's last redoubts suggests that change is in the right direction but very slow. The problem is that while democracy may prevent famine, democracy is also less likely, and less likely to last, in environments where famine is a risk. with temperature changes of 2 to 5 degrees centigrade. 34 Now, Africa is not North America, and adapting to colder climes may be technologically easier than adapting to global warming. But the Olmstead-Rhode study hints at possibilities that should not be ruled out.
The third piece of bad news is war. Throughout history wars have caused or exacerbated famine, and the experience of World War II highlights the vulnerability of even relatively wealthy economies to total war. Today famine is a serious threat only in places seriously threatened by war or autarky. In recent years the FAO has produced an annual list of countries requiring external food assistance, and giving the reasons why. It divides countries at risk into three categories: those facing exceptional shortfalls in aggregate production/supplies; those suffering 'widespread lack of access', and those faced by 'severe localized food insecurity'. As the data in Table 4 , which refer to 2009, make clear, more often than not, the main reason given for food insecurity were civil conflict, poor governance, or the burden placed by HIV/AIDS, rather than adverse weather or poor crops per se. May the BBC reported that 'officially more than 100 people starved to death by March in Kasungu', the worst affected district, in Malawi's 'worst-ever' famine.
The higher estimates of 'at least 500-1,000' and '1,000-3,000' proposed by
Stephen Devereux 38 imply is an increase of about one per cent above the normal death rate.
In late 2005 Malawi was in trouble again, with aid agencies claiming that 'at least five million people face starvation this winter', the World Food Programme declaring a funding shortfall of 'at least $70 million', and the government warning that without outside help 'hundreds of thousands of Malawians will die'. 39 Happily, no crisis materialized. Since 2005 a series of favourable seasons and generous subsidies through cheap fertilizers have increased maize output substantially. 40 By 2008/9 Malawi was a net exporter of maize, and it was almost as if its food supply problems were in the past. But if Malawi's recent famines or near-famines have been exaggerated, predicting the future on the basis of a few good years in succession is equally foolhardy. Whether seed and fertilizer subsidies offer an enduring and sustainable cure for economic backwardness remains moot. The trouble is that subsidies are of least assistance to poor farmers dependent on marginal soils and that the long-term viability of a programme that subsidizes two million cultivators out of the public purse is questionable.
Niger is a landlocked country constrained by an ecologically fragile resource base, and with a rate of population growth that leaves the margin over subsistence worryingly tight. Robert Malthus, a technological pessimist, would have been dumbfounded at the ability of Niger's farm sector to keep pace with a population that was increasing at 3-4 per cent annually. Its ability to do so implies significant productivity gains in order to stand still-and considerable resilience in a context of threatened soil erosion and, indeed, desertification. In semi-technical jargon, keeping food supplies per head constant when population is growing at such a pace requires greater efficiency and productivity gains than those achieved by European agriculture before World War 2. 41 Niger's crisis was one of the biggest news stories of the summer of 2005.
Once again it was the BBC who broke the story. ' We are going to lose many, many thousands of lives', predicted John O'Shea of the Irish NGO GOAL two days after Hilary Andersson's report from Zinder province. 42 On the same day, UN spokesman Jan Egeland accused the international community of reacting slowly to the crisis:
later he declared that more donations were received in the week following the BBC broadcast than in the previous six months. The same broadcast prompted the boast from O'Shea claimed that GOAL had 'fed more people in its first week in Niger than the UN had this year'. 43 Graphic and apocalyptic accounts of the disaster in Niger followed. There In reality crisis-induced excess mortality in Niger was almost certainly minimal. A scholarly study published in 2008 attempted to estimate mortality on the basis of a sample survey carried out in the wake of the crisis. 44 The highest daily mortality rate found was 0.7 per 10,000 in Zinder province; the estimate for Niger as a whole was 0.4 per 10,000. The authors conclude that Niger constituted a 'food crisis' but not a 'famine'. Indeed, had the aggregate daily rate lasted a
year, it would convert to an annual rate less than 15 per thousand, or considerably less than the annual death rate reported by international agencies for Niger in the early 2000s.
The 2005 crisis is worth comparing with that of 1931, when drought and locusts destroyed most of the staple millet crop, because the comparison offers evidence of progress made in the interim. First, the 1931 famine's toll in terms of deaths and emigration exceeded 150,000, with excess mortality in the tens of thousands. 45 Second, colonial tax exactions were a factor, as was the paucity of aid from the colonial power. During 1931 food aid totalled 140 tons for the 0.5 million living in the three worst-hit districts of Niamey, Dosso, and Tillabery, and much of that aid was in the form of loans. In the following year the authorities took their responsibilities more seriously, but food ordered for Niamey and Tillabery in late 1931 had yet to arrive in July 1932. Relief was therefore both inadequate and slow. 46 Third, the price of millet more than quintupled at its peak during the third quarter of 1931, whereas in 2005 the price at most doubled. Most vulnerable in 1931 were those nomadic pastoralists who relied on the market for their food, and who saw their entitlements dwindle to almost nothing as livestock prices plummeted and food prices soared. Only the need to fund their tax burdens drove farmers to the market. In sum, the contrast between 1931 and 2005 could not be starker. Today the main burden facing Niger is its fertility rate, apparently the highest in the world (see Table 5 ). 47 It has been largely spared the catastrophe of HIV/AIDS, an affliction largely absent in the Muslim countries of north and western Africa. This motivation has nothing to do with raising more funds, but simply with raising awareness for a forgotten crisis that causes many unnecessary deaths, but that has been considered to be normal because we got used to a under-five-mortality rate of 200 children out of every 1,000 newborn. 50 It would seem that MSF had, in effect, cried wolf in Niger. As Alex de Waal put it, 'the Niger crisis is an example of how a crisis in an African country is portrayed according to a particular script which doesn't actually necessarily fit the reality of that crisis'. 51 Both the Niger and Malawi examples should be set against the historical lesson that even in very poor countries once-off harvest failures and attendant price spikes do not necessarily produce famine in peacetime. Such events were common enough for people to insure against them: to deny this is to deny the prudence and resilience of the very poor.
If the news from Niger and Malawi offers some cause for tempered optimism, are there other hopeful signs? One is the huge increase in global productivity. Angus Maddison's estimates imply that global GDP per head of population rose fivefold during the twentieth century, and has almost quadrupled since mid-century (Table 6 ). And there are reasons to believe that such calculations underestimate the true increase in global living standards. 52 A byproduct of this growth has been a vastly improved capacity to store food and to ship it long distances at short notice.
Naturally, the growth in food output has not been commensurate. FAO data suggest that world food output (in kcals rather than in dollars) has risen by nearly four-fifths since 1980, or considerably faster than population (which has increased by half). So, in global terms, the margin over subsistence is now much wider than it was a generation ago. This also holds for former famine zones such as India and Bangladesh, whereas China, once the 'land of famine', nowadays faces a growing problem of childhood obesity. In Africa, where malnutrition and destitution is greatest, the recent record is mixed, however, and leaves no room for complacency. Figure 1 shows Africa as a whole performing better than Southern Africa, and food outstripping population in both Niger and Malawi in the recent past. The future course of population growth is crucial; and science writer Fred Pearce may well be right that current UN population projections underestimate the prospects for 'softer' demographic adjustment through fertility decline in the world's poorest regions. 53 The productivity gap between Sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world has been widening. 54 In the 1970s GDP per head in China was not much higher than in Malawi or Niger; today it is ten to twelve times as high. There are no easy solutions to bridging that gap. Yet given the productive capacity of humankind in the modern era, famines in even the poorest economies are avoidable scandals. It is time to make them history. 
